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SAVING GRACE: THE ROLE OF
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN
DISASTER RECOVERY AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF FEDERAL
FUNDING TO REBUILD THEM
Chelsea Till*
ABSTRACT
Natural disasters are on the rise and religious organizations, the same
organizations that came to victims’ rescue in the wake of the last natural
disaster, are often left in the path of destruction. Under President Trump’s
administration, FEMA recently amended its disaster assistance program to
provide funding for religious organizations. Opponents argue this amend-
ment is a violation of the Establishment Clause, while proponents argue the
amended plan finally gives religious organizations the fair treatment they
deserve. This new aid program needs to be modified and restricted.
Though there is clear precedent to support providing some Public Assis-
tance funding to religious organizations, FEMA’s current program results
in government funding that advances religion. This paper traces Supreme
Court precedent discussing the relevant tests when evaluating the receipt of
federal funds by religious organizations, and ultimately concludes that
FEMA’s disaster relief aid program goes too far.
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I. INTRODUCTION
HURRICANE Harvey’s landfall in Rockport, Texas, on August25, 2017, marked the beginning of what seemed like an endlessstring of catastrophic devastation along the coastal United
States.1 In what is being called “the storm of the century,” Hurricane
Harvey blew past the national storm record with over five feet of re-
ported rainfall.2 Bringing back memories of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
from 2005, Hurricane Irma made landfall on the coast of Florida just days
later on September 10, 2017.3 In the weeks that ensued, aid and relief
came from many sources, including Federal Emergency Management
Agency (FEMA), local governments, and private nonprofits.4 Though the
federal government relies on FEMA for coordinated relief following a
natural disaster, private—specifically faith-based—nonprofits account for
roughly 80% of all natural disaster recovery efforts annually.5 Hurricanes
Harvey and Irma were no different, as more than 300 voluntary organiza-
1. See Hurricane Harvey: Facts, FAQs, and How to Help, WORLD VISION, https://
www.worldvision.org/disaster-relief-news-stories/hurricane-harvey-facts [https://perma.cc/
6PX6-8PPP] (last updated Feb. 14, 2018).
2. Jason Samenow, 60 Inches of Rain Fell From Hurricane Harvey in Texas, Shatter-
ing U.S. Storm Record, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/capital-weather-gang/wp/2017/08/29/harvey-marks-the-most-extreme-rain-event-in-u-
s-history/?utm_term=.ab06fa2b3af0 [https://perma.cc//6PG6-68HM].
3. Hurricane Irma Makes Landfall in Lower Florida Keys, CBS NEWS (Sept. 9, 2017,
6:00 PM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/hurricane-irma-track-update-florida-path-live-
09-09-2017/ [https://perma.cc//2RA8-4BJR].
4. See Press Release, FEMA, Historic Disaster Response to Hurricane Harvey in
Texas (Sept. 22, 2017) [hereinafter Press Release, Historic Disaster Response], https://www
.fema.gov/news-release/2017/09/22/historic-disaster-response-hurricane-harvey-texas
[https://perma.cc/G3FZ-HM8Z].
5. Paul Singer, Faith Groups Provide the Bulk of Disaster Recovery in Coordination
with FEMA, USA TODAY (Sept. 10, 2017, 3:10 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
politics/2017/09/10/hurricane-irma-faith-groups-provide-bulk-disaster-recovery-coordina
tion-fema/651007001/ [https://perma.cc/823N-8Z74].
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tions, many of which were religious in nature, were involved in support-
ing Houston survivors alone.6
FEMA’s Public Assistance policies in place at the times of both storms
categorically barred impacted houses of worship and religious institutions
from eligibility for public funding.7 Additionally, the policy guide pre-
cluded religious non-profits from eligibility for reimbursement of costs
associated with sheltering and caring for victims.8 These restrictions re-
sulted in a significant controversy, which ultimately led three Texas-based
churches and two Florida-based synagogues to sue FEMA in the federal
courts for discrimination and violations of the Stafford Act.9
In early January 2018, the Trump Administration and FEMA worked
to modify FEMA’s policy guide, deleting the language that preempted
houses of worship and religious institutions from eligibility.10 Though
popular among nonprofits, this decision was challenged by advocacy
groups that favor a separation of church and state, arguing that this action
violates the Establishment Clause.11
Just a few months later in April 2018, FEMA took things a step further
by amending their disaster relief aid policy guide.12 Specifically, the new
policy guide lists houses of worship as eligible facilities and makes clear
that buildings “used primarily for religious purposes or instruction . . . are
eligible regardless of their religious character.”13
The fairness, necessity, and legality of providing federal disaster relief
to religiously affiliated nonprofits and houses of worship is a critical issue
for America today. With tensions rising between secular and religious in-
stitutions, and with natural disasters becoming increasingly more com-
mon and destructive, the significance of this issue only stands to increase.
It must be recognized that modern Supreme Court precedent preempts
FEMA from categorically excluding houses of worship and religious or-
6. Press Release, Historic Disaster Response, supra note 4.
7. FEMA, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FP 104-009-2, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PRO-
GRAM AND POLICY GUIDE 15 (2d ed. 2017) [hereinafter 2017 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PRO-
GRAM AND POLICY GUIDE], https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1496435662672-
d79ba9e1edb16e60b51634af00f490ae/2017_PAPPG_2.0_508_FINAL(2).pdf.
8. Id.
9. See Michelle Boorstein, In a Shift, Trump Administration Says Houses of Worship




10. FEMA, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FP 104-009-2, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PRO-
GRAM AND POLICY GUIDE 15 (3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter 2018 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PRO-
GRAM AND POLICY GUIDE], https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1515614675577-be7f
d5e0cac814441c313882924c5c0a/PAPPG_V3_508_FINAL.pdf (Version 3.0); see Boorstein,
supra note 9.
11. See Boorstein, supra note 9.
12. FEMA, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., FP 104-009-2, PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PRO-
GRAM AND POLICY GUIDE 15 (3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter AMENDED 2018 PUBLIC ASSIS-
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ganizations from funding eligibility solely based on their religious nature.
However, the Establishment Clause places fundamental limits on the
types of funding available to religious organizations, and the amended
policy guide allows funding beyond the scope of these fundamental limits.
Part I of this comment will address the historical background of relig-
ious nonprofit involvement in disaster recovery. Part II will address vari-
ous historical developments in the interpretation of the Establishment
Clause. Part III will discuss the current status of the law as defined by
Trinity Lutheran and the revised FEMA Policy Guide.14 Finally, Part IV
will address the constitutionality of FEMA’s updated Public Assistance
policies and consider the legitimacy of various arguments in favor of ex-
panding the funding available to houses of worship.
II. BOOTS ON THE GROUND: RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT
INVOLVEMENT IN DISASTER RECOVERY
Nonprofits, both religious and secular in nature, play a fundamental
role in disaster recovery. After witnessing the efficacy of nonprofit in-
volvement in disaster recovery and realizing that this impact could be
magnified through strategic coordination, FEMA has established guide-
lines to coordinate their work alongside nonprofit organizations.15 For
example, in the weeks following Hurricane Katrina, FEMA and the
American Red Cross organized a national operations center in Washing-
ton, D.C. that included representatives from various national charities,
including the Salvation Army and the Southern Baptist Convention.16
Additionally, this operations center organized daily conference calls be-
tween FEMA, National Volunteer Organizations Aiding in Disasters
(VOAD), and over forty other nonprofit organizations where the federal
government and private nonprofits were able to share information and
address each organization’s ability to meet identified needs.17 As ex-
plained by Jamie Johnson, Director of the Department of Homeland Se-
curity’s Center for Faith-Based & Neighborhood Partnerships, “FEMA
cannot do what it does so well without the cooperation of faith-based
nonprofit organizations and churches.”18
This cooperation comes in many forms, and the following statements
represent just a few examples:
• FEMA helped expedite a customs process to enable Samaritan’s
Purse (an evangelical nonprofit) to bring in disaster response equip-
14. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Colombia, Inc. v. Comer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017);
supra note 12 and accompanying text.
15. See To Review the Responses By Charities To Hurricane Katrina: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Oversight of the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 109th Cong. 23–24 (2005)
[hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Cynthia M. Fagnoni, Managing Director, Education,
Workforce & Income Sec., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office).
16. Id. at 24.
17. Id.
18. Singer, supra note 5.
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ment from Canada.19
• FEMA often requests the Convoy of Hope (a non-denominational
Christian organization), a group specialized in food distribution, to
set up feeding stations in the wake of disaster.20
• FEMA has also taken note of the Seventh Day Adventists’ “unique
expertise in disaster ‘warehousing,’” and is currently working with
the group to identify a facility in Texas that the state will own but
the Adventists will manage.21
However, nonprofit involvement extends beyond just coordination with
FEMA—nonprofits often step in when the federal government simply
cannot. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, religious nonprofits,
such as the Salvation Army, were documented working in areas that
FEMA was unable to reach due to safety and flooding regulations.22 Ad-
ditionally, local churches in Birmingham, Alabama, opened their doors to
shelter over 7,000 evacuees when FEMA was unable to provide sufficient
shelter for them.23
In conclusion, as a large-scale federal agency, FEMA has the resources
and capacity to expedite change, coordinate large groups of people, and
utilize federal funds. However, FEMA recognizes the unique specializa-
tion, manpower, and passion that each of these nonprofits stands to offer
and gladly accepts their support in the aftermath of disaster.24 As John-
son explained, FEMA wants to work with these nonprofits “because they
have their people on the ground”—they know the area, they know the
people, and they are uniquely equipped to know how to help.25
III. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE HISTORICALLY
As explained by the Supreme Court, the Establishment Clause was in-
tended to protect against government “sponsorship, financial support,
and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity.”26 The Su-
preme Court historically addressed issues of funding and religious institu-
tions under the Lemon Test (the Test), which calls for strict separation.27
However, in recent years there has been a shift towards a sense of neu-
trality.28 Thus, because Lemon v. Kurtzman has not been overruled, de-
spite the more neutral holdings of Agostini v. Felton and Trinity Lutheran
Church v. Comer, there is room to argue as to how the Supreme Court




22. Hearing, supra note 15, at 25.
23. Id.
24. See Singer, supra note 5.
25. Id.
26. Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
27. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
28. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Colombia v. Cromer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017); Agos-
tini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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A. FUNDING PAROCHIAL AND RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS
IN PRE-LEMON WORLD
During the 1960s and 1970s, the court system was flooded with cases
challenging state funds being used to benefit parochial schools or the
families who sent their children to them. The Supreme Court heard many
of these cases, the first of which was Board of Education v. Allen.29 In
Allen, the petitioners challenged a New York state program which re-
quired state school boards to loan textbooks to all schools within the
state, both public and private.30 Even though receiving free textbooks
stood to help parochial schools save money, the Court held that the pro-
gram did not violate the Establishment Clause because the statute was
facially neutral—that is, it did not benefit students in parochial schools
any more than it benefited students in public schools.31 The Court also
found policy considerations for the benefits of promoting education fun-
damental to their holding.32 Finally, and most notably, was the Court’s
recognition that even though school boards were required to furnish pa-
rochial schools with loaned textbooks, the school board had discretion
over the titles provided.33 Thus, state funds could be used to provide
books on secular topics, such as math and literature; however, the state
would have the ability to deny requests for books of a religious nature.34
Even with the financial support of the loaned textbooks, parochial
schools were still struggling. As a result, many states began providing
more resources to parochial schools in the form of aid packages. These
aid packages were the root issue in Lemon v. Kurtzman.
B. THE LEMON TEST—1971
In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Supreme Court gleaned a three-part test
from decades’ worth of Supreme Court precedent.35 Under this test, a
statute “must have a secular legislative purpose, . . . its principal or pri-
mary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion, . . .
[and] the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement
with religion.’”36 Further explaining this test, the Court stated that “[i]n
order to determine whether the government entanglement with religion is
excessive, we must examine the character and purposes of the institutions
that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the
resulting relationship between the government and the religious
authority.”37
29. Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
30. Id. at 238–39.
31. Id. at 243–44.
32. Id. at 247.
33. Id. at 244–45.
34. Id. at 245.
35. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
36. Id. (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 615.
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The facts of Lemon were quite simple—activists were challenging two
state plans that reimbursed private schools for all or part of their costs
associated with teaching secular topics.38 The logic behind this was
clear—the state schools would otherwise have had to provide the secular
education to students. Thus, the private schools were saving the state
money and deserved to be compensated.39 However, the Court disagreed,
ruling that the state programs violated the Establishment Clause. The de-
cision hinged on the third element of the Test, and the Court found that
requiring the state to monitor teacher planning, classroom activities, and
overall expenditures would result in “excessive [government] entangle-
ment” with the religious schools.40 The key element here was that the
monitoring would have to be ongoing and continuous, thus resulting in
the excessive entanglement.41
The reach of the Lemon Test peaked in the mid-1980s when two similar
cases reached the Supreme Court.42 Grand Rapids School District v. Ball
challenged a Michigan school program which provided funding for the
salaries of private school teachers who taught secular topics and provided
private schools with teachers from public schools who could teach on sec-
ular topics.43 The Supreme Court found these programs to be unconstitu-
tional based on the Lemon Test’s second prong, arguing that by reducing
costs associated with secular teaching, the religious schools would be able
to funnel more funding into facilitating religious instruction and activi-
ties.44 The Court also raised concerns that providing resources to relig-
ious schools might be perceived as supporting religious causes by the
public, essentially creating a symbolic link.45
In Aguilar v. Felton, the Court was presented with a similar program,
but focused its analysis on the Lemon Test’s third prong.46 New York City
realized that children growing up in poverty or low-income areas were
likely to struggle academically. In an effort to combat this, the city insti-
tuted a program where public school teachers would offer free, remedial
education lessons to young students from poor neighborhoods.47 Because
the lessons were to occur in both public and private schools, the program
included mechanisms for the city to ensure the teachers’ content re-
mained entirely secular in nature, even when working in a religious
school.48 The Court noted that the plan for monitoring potentially elimi-
nated any violation of the Lemon Test’s second prong. However, the plan
38. Id. at 606–07.
39. See id. at 607–08.
40. Id. at 614.
41. See id. at 619.
42. See Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402
(1985).
43. 473 U.S. at 375.
44. See id. at 385.
45. Id.
46. See Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 402.
47. Id. at 404.
48. Id. at 407.
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simultaneously created an issue with the third prong.49 Because the city
would have to continuously monitor the teachers’ content on an ongoing
basis, the government would be “excessively entangled” in violation of
the third prong.50
From these three cases and their respective implementations of the
Lemon Test, it can be discerned that requirements for ongoing monitor-
ing by the state will almost always violate the Test’s third prong.51 Addi-
tionally, the Court considers saved costs as a mechanism for
supplementing expenses related to religion, ultimately violating the sec-
ond prong of the Test.52
C. PERMISSIBLE DIRECT FUNDING OF RELIGIOUS
INSTITUTIONS’ FACILITIES
Though the Supreme Court’s 1971 position on state funds and religious
institutions seemed quite clear in Lemon, things got a bit confusing when
the Court handed down their decision in Tilton v. Richardson.53 Ironi-
cally, even though Lemon and Tilton were decided on the same day, their
outcomes seem somewhat contradictory.
For example, in Tilton, the Court evaluated and ultimately upheld the
Higher Education Facilities Act (HEFA).54 This statute created federal
grants for institutions of higher education to use in the construction of
new facilities.55 The lawsuit alleged that providing these grants to institu-
tions of higher education with a religious affiliation would violate the Es-
tablishment Clause.56 However, the Court quickly pointed out that the
statute expressly excludes the funds from being used to construct “any
facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for relig-
ious worship, or . . . any facility . . . which is used or to be used primarily
in connection with any part of the program of a school or department of
divinity.”57 As explained in the case, prior to receiving grant funding, the
United States Commissioner of Education “require[d] applicants to pro-
vide assurances that [the] restrictions [would] be respected.”58 Addition-
ally, if within twenty years of receiving federal funding the facility was
used in a manner that violated the restrictions, the United States govern-
ment was entitled to reimbursement.59 Most significantly, the restrictions
would be enforced via “on-site inspections.”60
49. Id. at 409.
50. Id. at 410–11.
51. See id. at 409–11; Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613–14 (1971).
52. See Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 393–94 (1985).
53. 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
54. Id. at 689.
55. Higher Education Facilities Act, Pub. L. No. 88-204, 77 Stat. 363 (1964) (repealed
1972).
56. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 676.
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The Court first noted that the desire to expand institutions of higher
education as a whole was a legitimate secular objective (the Lemon Test’s
first prong).61 Regarding the second prong, the Court noted that while
receiving funds for secular expenses does stand to benefit religious insti-
tutions, “[t]he crucial question is not whether some benefit accrues to a
religious institution as a consequence of the legislative program, but
whether its principal or primary effect advances religion.”62
In regard to the third prong of the Test, the Court drew a significant
distinction between two classes of cases. The Court noted that in cases
like Lemon, religious institutions received aid in the form of teachers who
were “not necessarily religiously neutral.”63 However, in cases like Allen
and Tilton, the religious institutions received aid “in the form of secular,
neutral, or nonideological services, facilities, or materials that are sup-
plied to all students regardless of the affiliation of the school that they
attend.”64 Because the aid is “religiously neutral,” the “corresponding
need for surveillance [and monitoring is] therefore reduced,” thus elimi-
nating the risk of government entanglements with religion.65
Finally, the Court also compared the continuous nature of the pay-
ments from the programs in Lemon with the one-time payments for the
facilities in Tilton.66 The Court found this significant because the govern-
ment’s contact with the religious institution was limited and there were
“no continuing financial relationships or dependencies, no annual audits,
and no governmental analysis of an institution’s expenditures on secular
as distinguished from religious activities,” and because “[i]nspection[s] as
to use [are] a minimal contact.”67
We can derive several key points from Tilton. First, the Court was satis-
fied with an assurance from religious institutions that the funds would be
used properly—it took them at their word.68 Second, we see that the
Court considered policy implications and the value of the program in its
analysis.69 Third, the Court finds factors such as “religiously neutral” aid
and one-time payments to be significant considerations when assessing
the requirements for monitoring and entanglements under the third
prong.70 Finally, ongoing monitoring does not necessarily equate to ex-
cessive entanglement; rather, a court must consider the factors mentioned
above.71
61. Id. at 679.
62. Id. at 678–79.
63. Id. at 687–88; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
64. Tilton, 403 U.S. at 687.
65. Id. at 688.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 679–80.
69. See id. at 678–79.
70. See id. at 688.
71. See id.
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D. PERMISSIBLE DIRECT FUNDING OF PROGRAMS OFFERED
BY RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
The next important case for consideration is Bowen v. Kendrick.72
Bowen created precedent legitimizing the permissible use of federal funds
to aid organizations—including those with a religious nature—that are
involved in promoting a particular secular purpose.73 This case chal-
lenged the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), which provided grants
to private and public organizations, including religiously affiliated non-
profits, who provide either “care services” or “prevention services” re-
lated to adolescent pregnancies.74 In its opinion, the Court highlighted
Congress’s recognition that adolescent sexuality was a complex issue and
that “‘such problems are best approached through a variety of integrated
and essential services provided to adolescents and their families by other
family members, religious and charitable organizations, voluntary as-
sociations, and other groups in the private sector as well as services pro-
vided by publicly sponsored initiatives.’”75 Another significant aspect of
this opinion was the Court’s action to strike down the concept of the
“symbolic link” that many opponents argue forms when a religious or-
ganization receives federal funding; the Court held that this argument
was too far-reaching and would jeopardize things like government aid to
religiously affiliated hospitals.76
This case also recognized the important distinction between religiously
affiliated organizations, such as hospitals, and “pervasively sectarian” or-
ganizations, such as parochial schools or churches, where the religious
nature permeates the organization.77 In response to concerns that it was
not only possible, but probable, that pervasively sectarian organizations
would receive funding, the Court stated that it “do[es] not think the pos-
sibility that AFLA grants may go to religious institutions that can be con-
sidered ‘pervasively sectarian’ is sufficient to conclude that no grants
whatsoever can be given under the statute to religious organizations.”78
This is significant, because the Court recognized that the Establishment
Clause is not necessarily violated even when there is a risk of pervasively
sectarian organizations receiving federal funds. Rather, the Court opens
the door for possible consequences if a pervasively sectarian organization
utilized State funds in an unconstitutional manner (such as for funding
worship services).79
Additionally, the Court also pointed to the fact that the projects au-
thorized by the AFLA—”including pregnancy testing, adoption counsel-
ing . . . educational services, residential care, consumer education, etc.”
72. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
73. Id.
74. Adolescent Family Life Act, Pub. L. 97-35, 95 Stat. 578 (1982).
75. Bowen, 487 U.S. at 595 (internal quotation omitted).
76. See id. at 613–14.
77. Id. at 610–11.
78. Id. at 611.
79. See id.
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were facially neutral, regardless of whether they were performed by relig-
ious organizations or in the context of a church or room with religious
symbols.80 The Court was satisfied that these facially neutral programs,
combined with a system of monitoring, were sufficient to ensure funds
would be properly used, regardless of an organization’s religious nature.81
Specifically, the AFLA required a detailed application outlining pro-
posed services, evaluations of the rendered services, and financial report-
ing regarding the use of federal funds.82 Ultimately, the Court was
satisfied that the systems in place via the statutory scheme were sufficient
to necessitate only a minimal amount of monitoring, thus eliminating any
issues of excessive entanglement.83
E. REVISITING AGUILAR TWELVE YEARS LATER
The Supreme Court revisited the issues faced in Aguilar twelve years
after handing down the decision when petitioners sought relief from the
injunction preventing public school teachers from providing remedial ser-
vices to students of private schools.84 In its opinion, the Court stated that
its interpretation of the “Establishment Clause law has ‘significantly
changed’ since we decided Aguilar,” thus making Agostini v. Felton an
opportunity for the Court to clarify and expand its current view on per-
missible aid towards religious organizations.85
Since Grand Rapids and Aguilar, the Court had changed its “under-
standing of the criteria used to assess whether aid to religion has an im-
permissible effect” on advancing religion.86 In Agostini, the Court held
that providing relief that was entirely secular in nature and available to
all students, regardless of their school, did not have the effect of advanc-
ing religion in an impermissible way (even though it would result in sav-
ing the religious schools money that could be used for other purposes).87
Additionally, the Court found that “unannounced monthly visits of public
supervisors” to ensure lessons were being taught in a secular nature was
not a sufficient contact to create “excessive entanglement.”88 This is sig-
nificant because it reinforced the shift shown in Bowen away from any
previous holdings that ongoing contact and monitoring violates the third
prong of the Lemon Test.89
Agostini was a landmark case that opened the doors for many federal
aid programs and ultimately lead to additional cases questioning these
programs under the Establishment Clause. One of these cases was Mitch-
80. See id. at 613, 635 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Kendrick v. Bowen, 657 F.
Supp. 1547, 1562 (D.D.C. 1987)).
81. See Bowen, 487 U.S. at 615.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 616.
84. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 208 (1997).
85. Id. at 237.
86. Id. at 223.
87. Id. at 225.
88. Id. at 234.
89. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 616 (1988).
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ell v. Helms, which marked the Court’s continued trend towards neutral-
ity instead of the strict separation called for in the years immediately
following Lemon.90
Mitchell considered an aid package that provided technology equip-
ment to all schools in the state.91 In a notable analysis of the second
prong of the Lemon Test, the Court explained that “the question whether
governmental aid to religious schools results in governmental indoctrina-
tion is ultimately a question [of] whether any religious indoctrination that
occurs in those schools could reasonably be attributed to the governmen-
tal action.”92 The Court further explained that “[i]n distinguishing be-
tween indoctrination that is attributable to the State and indoctrination
that is not, we have consistently turned to the principle of neutrality, up-
holding aid that is offered to a broad range of groups or persons without
regard to their religion.”93 In other words, “if the government, seeking to
further some legitimate secular purpose, offers aid on the same terms,
without regard to religion, to all who adequately further that purpose,
then it is fair to say that any aid going to a religious recipient only has the
effect of furthering that secular purpose.”94
If we were to line each of these cases up on a timeline, it would be easy
to see a notable shift in the Court’s interpretation of the Establishment
Clause under the Lemon Test. Though the Test has not been overruled,
and each of the three prongs are ever-present in modern analysis, it is
clear that the Court has loosened its grip on its interpretation of each
prong. Bowen marks the Court’s determination that a “symbolic link”
between the government and any organization that receives funding is
too broad to justify invalidation.95 Further, Agostini opens the door for
ongoing monitoring without creating an “excessive entanglement.”96 Fi-
nally, Mitchell shifts the Court’s inquiry to whether or not aid was offered
to a large group of organizations for an entirely secular purpose.97 Each
of these transitions plays a fundamental role in the status of the law
today.
IV. FEMA’S UPDATED POLICIES
In early January 2018, FEMA released the third edition of their Public
Assistance Program and Policy Guide (the Guide). The purpose of this
new edition was to delete any and all language categorically barring relig-
ious organizations from eligibility to receive public assistance funding.98
The Guide explains that in light of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in
90. See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
91. Id. at 801–02.
92. Id. at 809.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 810.
95. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 613–14 (1988).
96. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 224 (1997).
97. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 809–10 (2000).
98. 2018 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE, supra note 10, at vii.
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Trinity Lutheran, the agency has “considered its guidance on private non-
profit facility eligibility” and will no longer “exclude houses of worship
from eligibility for FEMA aid on the basis of the religious character or
primarily religious use of the facility.”99
Trinity Lutheran is a landmark case that redefined the balance that
must exist between the protections afforded by the Establishment Clause
and those afforded by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment.100 The case challenged a Missouri Department of Natural Re-
sources grant program that categorically excluded churches or other
religious organizations from grant eligibility.101 The grants were available
to qualifying schools and daycares for purchasing rubber playground sur-
faces made from recycled tires.102 Even though Trinity Lutheran’s day-
care center was able to demonstrate that the benefits of their updated
playground would stem beyond just their congregation’s families and
ranked fifth among all grant applicants based on the department’s rank-
ing for impact and sustainability, the religious nonprofit was disqualified
from eligibility based on its religious affiliation.103 In the lawsuit that fol-
lowed, “[t]he [c]hurch alleged that the Department’s failure to approve
the Center’s application, pursuant to its policy of denying grants to relig-
iously affiliated applicants, violates the Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.”104
In its analysis, the Supreme Court explained that “[a]pplying [the] basic
principle [of the Establishment Clause], this Court has repeatedly con-
firmed that denying a generally available benefit solely on account of re-
ligious identity imposes a penalty on the free exercise of religion that can
be justified only by a state interest ‘of the highest order.’”105 Because any
daycare or school in the state is generally able to apply for and potentially
receive a playground grant, the Court stated that “the refusal to allow the
church—solely because it is a church—to compete with secular organiza-
tions for a grant” is “express discrimination.”106 In holding that the re-
striction violated the Free Exercise Clause, the Court pointed to the
unavoidable choice Trinity Lutheran, or any other church, would be faced
with—receive an “otherwise available benefit,” or maintain your relig-
ious affiliation.107
The conclusion of the opinion clearly and succinctly demonstrates the
Supreme Court’s current stance on issues such as the one above—“[t]he
consequence is, in all likelihood, a few extra scraped knees. But the exclu-
sion of Trinity Lutheran from a public benefit for which it is otherwise
99. Id.
100. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Colombia v. Cromer, 137 S. Ct. 2012 (2017).
101. Id. at 2017.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2018.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 2019 (citation omitted).
106. Id. at 2022.
107. See id. at 2021–22.
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qualified, solely because it is a church, is odious to our Constitution all
the same, and cannot stand.”108
The churches and synagogues that initiated suits against FEMA rooted
their arguments in Trinity Lutheran, arguing that the same principles
should apply to FEMA’s Public Assistance Program.109 As mentioned
above, in response to the lawsuit, FEMA updated their policies. Though
this was a victory for those in favor of federal funding for religious orga-
nizations, both sides continued to debate the issue and argue over various
interpretations of the amendment. As a result, FEMA recently released a
new amendment clarifying that houses of worship “used primarily for re-
ligious purposes or instruction” are eligible for disaster relief funding.110
A. FEMA’S CURRENT REQUIREMENTS FOR PUBLIC
ASSISTANCE ELIGIBILITY
The updated Guide, now free of any religious exclusions, outlines a
very clear structure for funding eligibility. To be eligible for funding, a
private nonprofit (PNP) must demonstrate that it is a nonprofit organiza-
tion and that it owns or operates an eligible facility.111 In determining
facility eligibility, FEMA breaks down eligible facilities into two catego-
ries: facilities providing a critical service (“defined as education, utility,
emergency, or medical [services]”) and facilities providing “non-critical,
but essential social service[s].”112
The facilities at issue in the lawsuits and FEMA’s updated policies were
those providing non-critical but essential social services. Under the up-
dated policies, to qualify as a “non-critical, but essential” service facility,
the facility must provide services such as: youth and senior citizen group
meetings, alcohol and drug treatment, food assistance programs, home-
less shelters, services for battered spouses, or houses of worship.113 Addi-
tionally, the qualifying facility must be able to demonstrate that it is open
to the general public, meaning that use is not limited to certain individu-
als (or classes of individuals) and access is not restricted.114 However, a
footnote in the most recent amendment clarifies that “houses of worship
that limit[ ] leadership or membership to persons who share a religious
faith or practice still provide[ ] essential social services to the general
public.”115
If a nonprofit owns a facility comprised of multiple buildings, FEMA’s
108. Id. at 2024–25.
109. Aaron Colen, Separation of Church and State? Texas Churches Sue for FEMA Aid,
THE BLAZE (Sept. 6, 2017, 11:00 PM), https://www.theblaze.com/news/2017/09/06/separa
tion-of-church-and-state-texas-churches-sue-for-fema-aid [https://perma.cc/KHK8-VR35].
110. AMENDED 2018 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE, supra note
12, at vii.
111. Id. at 10–11.
112. Id. at 11.
113. Id. at 13.
114. Id. at 11.
115. Id.
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policy is to evaluate each building’s eligibility separately.116 Additionally,
FEMA has policies in place for evaluating buildings utilized for more
than one purpose. “[F]acilities that provide both eligible and ineligible
services are considered mixed-use facilities” and their eligibility for Pub-
lic Assistance is “dependent on the primary use of the facility, which is
determined by the amount of physical space dedicated to eligible and in-
eligible services.”117 If more than 50% of a facility’s use is for eligible
services, then the building’s primary use is eligible, thus making the build-
ing eligible for funds.118 However, the facility will only be eligible for a
prorated percentage of funding based on the building’s eligible use.119
FEMA has addressed the issue of the same physical space being used for
multiple purposes by creating specific policies for “mixed-use spaces.” In
a mixed-use space, “the primary use is the use for which more than 50%
of the operating time is dedicated in that shared physical space.”120
In addition to Public Assistance funding for rebuilding and repairs,
FEMA offers reimbursement for various qualifying costs associated with
disaster recovery. For example, costs associated with the evacuation and
sheltering of storm survivors are eligible for reimbursement.121 However,
if a PNP shelters or feeds any evacuees, they are not eligible for direct
reimbursement—instead, FEMA will reimburse the state or local govern-
ment who can then reimburse the PNP.122
The updated FEMA policies are a big win for all houses of worship.
However, they lead to two big questions. Are the policies in compliance
with the Establishment Clause? And if not, how do we provide enough
support for the organizations that are often a city’s saving grace in the
wake of disaster while staying within the confines of the Establishment
Clause?
B. AN EVALUATION OF FEMA’S UPDATED POLICIES
FEMA’s original revised Public Assistance Policy Guide seemed to
strike the most practical, and constitutional, balance possible when it
comes to funding eligibility for religiously affiliated organizations and
houses of worship. The Supreme Court’s progression from strict separa-
tion to a call for neutrality clearly allows for some sort of eligibility for
religious organizations to apply for FEMA’s public assistance funding.
However, this recent precedential shift does not rise to the level of neces-
sitating, or even allowing, federal funds to go towards rebuilding sanc-
116. Id. at 15.




121. Id. at 66.
122. Press Release, FEMA, Faith-based, Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations May
Be Eligible for FEMA Disaster Grants (Sept. 28, 2017) [hereinafter Press Release, FEMA
Disaster Grants], https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2017/09/28/faith-based-voluntary-
and-nonprofit-organizations-may-be-eligible-fema [https://perma.cc/M4TC-7VXV].
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tuaries and houses of worship that are not also used for neutral social
services. With FEMA’s recent policy changes, multiple lawsuits sitting in
federal court, and the reality that more storms are always coming, the
timing of this analysis is especially crucial. The nation is at a critical junc-
ture where either the federal courts or the legislature (or possibly both)
will soon determine the intricate balance that must exist between the pro-
tections afforded under the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses.
Funding available to PNPs, including religious organizations, under
FEMA’s Public Assistance Programs includes funds for rebuilding quali-
fied facilities and reimbursements for disaster assistance related expenses.
In the case of religious congregations, the possibility of funding two sepa-
rate kinds of facilities arises: (1) sanctuaries or main worship spaces, and
(2) religiously neutral facilities that happen to be owned by religious or-
ganizations. Thus, this analysis will divide the constitutional analysis into
three categories: reimbursements, funds for rebuilding a sanctuary or
main worship space, and funds for rebuilding community centers and
other neutral spaces.
1. Reimbursements
Reimbursements provided to religious nonprofits or houses of worship
for costs associated with disaster aid and recovery do not violate the Es-
tablishment Clause. The Supreme Court has transitioned to a more neu-
tral approach for Establishment Clause challenges. However, the Court
has not overruled the Lemon Test, which should form the framework of
this evaluation. The first prong requires that the reimbursement serve a
secular purpose.123 Here, the purpose is reimbursing state and local gov-
ernments (and sometimes PNPs) for disaster related costs that FEMA is
ultimately responsible for. These reimbursements are fundamental to
FEMA’s success because without reimbursements the state and local gov-
ernments and PNPs might be unwilling or unable to help in the wake of
future disasters, and as previously discussed, FEMA relies on their col-
laboration. Ultimately, the focus of the reimbursement policy is on restor-
ing the governing bodies and organizations that stepped in to help in the
aftermath of a storm, which is clearly a legitimate and secular purpose.
The next step in the analysis is the second prong—determining if the
funding advances religion in an impermissible way.124 As a reimburse-
ment, this funding is similar to the aid programs in Grand Rapids and
Lemon, where the government reimbursed parochial schools for costs as-
sociated with teaching secular topics.125 In these cases, the logic behind
the funding was that the parochial schools were providing a benefit that
the government is obligated to provide to all students (and was thus ulti-
mately saving the government money) and should be reimbursed.126 This
123. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
124. Id.
125. See Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 375–80 (1985); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 606–07.
126. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 616–17.
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is similar to the facts at hand, because in situations of disaster, FEMA is
charged with providing aid and shelter to evacuees. When state/local gov-
ernments and PNPs step in to provide these benefits, they are providing
something that the federal government is ultimately responsible for. Even
though the aid programs in Grand Rapids and Lemon were ruled uncon-
stitutional, the Supreme Court revisited this general line of reasoning in
Agostini and overruled part of their previous analysis.127
The Court reasoned in Agostini that aid available to all, and that is
entirely secular in nature, does not advance religion in an impermissible
way, even if it would ultimately save the religious organizations money.128
This reasoning can be applied to the issue of reimbursements, because
FEMA’s reimbursement policy is available to all state/local governments,
as well as any PNP (indirectly) who provides shelter, food, or other quali-
fied services to evacuees.129 Further, unlike the funding in Agostini, this
reimbursement will not serve to advance the organizations or save them
money. Rather, the reimbursement is a form of restoring the organiza-
tions to the place they were before stepping in to help. As is typical with
any reimbursement plan, governments and organizations do not make a
profit off of the payments they receive, the payments simply repay any
monies expended in the process of sheltering evacuees (i.e. purchasing
cots, buying first aid supplies, supplying food, cleaning materials, etc.).130
The PNPs don’t stand to benefit or gain anything from these reimburse-
ments, and the opportunity for reimbursement is available to any shelter
who provides qualified services; thus, under Agostini, there are likely no
issues with the Test’s second prong.
The final step in evaluating the reimbursement plan is to assess any
potential excessive government entanglements. Unlike each of the forms
of aid mentioned in the cases above, the money in FEMA’s reimburse-
ment plan is credited towards money already spent (as opposed to future
expenses).131 This is significant, because it eliminates the need for moni-
toring of the funds’ use in the future. In cases like Agostini, Bowen, and
Trinity Lutheran, there will always be some concern that funds might not
be used for the government’s intended purpose or maybe they will be
used in a way that simultaneously advances religion. However, where, as
here, the money has already been spent, that concern is almost entirely
eliminated. There is no question of what the money will be used for (or in
what manner) because it was already used—there are receipts and in-
voices ready to answer those exact questions. Thus, even though FEMA
will be charged with inspecting the receipts and determining which ex-
penses qualify for reimbursements, it cannot be said that reimbursements
will result in excessive entanglement. When compared with the recurring,
127. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997).
128. Id. at 223.
129. AMENDED 2018 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE, supra note
12, at 66–67.
130. See id. at 66.
131. See id.
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organized inspection procedures that the Court previously upheld,132 a
one-time inspection of receipts and financial documents requires signifi-
cantly less contact and involvement, and thus, should not create an exces-
sive entanglement.
In conclusion, the argument for reimbursements is probably the easiest
argument of the three to win under the Lemon Test. The reimbursements
involve far less contact with religious organizations than programs previ-
ously upheld by the Supreme Court, and there is no doubt as to how the
funds will be spent. Should the reimbursement policy face a constitutional
challenge, a court would likely uphold it.
2. Funding for Rebuilding a Sanctuary or Worship Space
The next step in the analysis is to consider whether FEMA’s policy of
providing funding for sanctuaries and houses of worship is allowable
under the Establishment Clause. It seems likely that this practice would
fail under at least two, but maybe three, prongs of the Test. First, it is hard
to argue that the amendment to include houses of worship was proposed
for an entirely secular and legitimate purpose. In its text, the amendment
clearly purports to provide a mechanism for houses of worship to receive
federal funding, and it cannot be said that this is an entirely secular pur-
pose. One could argue that this amendment stands to codify the holding
of Trinity Lutheran, as applied to FEMA funding, because it ensures ap-
plicants will not be disqualified solely based on their religious nature.
This argument is mildly convincing, but the situation is quite different
from that of Trinity Lutheran. Trinity Lutheran purported that it was a
violation of the Free Exercise Clause to restrict applicant eligibility solely
based on a religious nature in the context of playground facilities.133
However, it is a quite different situation when it comes to funding an
actual sanctuary. In fact, the Court noted this exact difference in footnote
three of the opinion, where it limited its holding to the context of a play-
ground and stated the Court “[did] not address religious uses of fund-
ing.”134 Additionally, the holding in Trinity Lutheran did not demand that
the parochial preschool receive funding, rather, the holding said religious
organizations could not be categorically excluded based on their religious
nature.135
It seems unlikely that the Court’s reasoning from Trinity Lutheran
would extend far enough to apply towards demanding direct government
funding of houses of worship. Proponents of funding worship spaces will
argue the secular purpose of the funding is rebuilding the facilities that
enable the community to thrive as a whole, which could include houses of
worship. This argument might work in the context of FEMA just ex-
132. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 616 (1988); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
672, 688 (1971).
133. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Colombia v. Cromer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2025 (2017).
134. Id. at 2024 n.3.
135. See id.
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panding their policies to include the possibility of religious organizations
receiving funding. However, it seems unlikely that this argument would
sway a court in the context of a policy explicitly written to ensure funding
eligibility for churches.136
The amendment would also probably fail the Test’s second prong be-
cause the amendment would stand to advance religion in an impermissi-
ble way. It is undeniable that federal funds would be going towards
improving houses of worship and religious sanctuaries. In Mitchell, the
Court stated that funds generally available to any group furthering a spe-
cific secular purpose will be construed as to advance that secular purpose,
and not a religious objective.137 However, this reasoning cannot apply
where, as here, there is no discrete secular purpose associated with re-
building churches. The idea of rebuilding a church cannot, in and of itself,
be secular—the two are in opposition. To provide funding to restore a
sanctuary to a usable state inherently advances religion—it enables the
congregation to continue worshipping, something they could not do
before the receipt of the funding. Additionally, the holding in Tilton
seems to suggest that the Court agrees with the notion that federal money
should not be used to fund spaces of worship.138 In that case, the Court
relied heavily on the prohibition of using the new buildings for worship or
religious instruction to justify their finding that the buildings would not
advance religion in an impermissible way.139 It would be difficult to rec-
oncile that line of reasoning with an argument that money to rebuild
churches does not advance religion in an impermissible way.
Arguing in the alternative, one could say that the funding would not
advance religion. Instead, the funding would simply restore the religious
congregations to where they were before the storm. This is a somewhat
logical argument, and it might have some bearing. Proponents could even
take the argument a step further and argue that building the “bones” of a
church has nothing to do with advancing religion, because a foundation,
drywall, and roofing shingles are all facially neutral products. This ap-
proach would inherently call for a separation between funding used to
restore a physical structure (arguably neutral) and funding used to re-
build an altar (undeniably religious).
From a logistical standpoint, this policy would be completely ineffective
and inefficient—it would be almost impossible to accurately differentiate
between the costs for tiling or drywalling the “neutral” spaces as opposed
to the “religious” spaces. Aside from the financial logistical difficulties,
this argument creates a never ending slippery slope. Truly, how would the
government draw the line between what is “neutral” and “religious”?
Would the decision be based entirely on the product, or would it be based
136. See AMENDED 2018 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE, supra
note 12, at vii–viii.
137. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000).
138. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 679–80 (1971).
139. See id.
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on the religion using the product? For example, consider the case of small
rugs. In a Christian church, the rugs could be argued as seemingly neutral
and just used for decorative purposes. However, in the context of an Is-
lamic mosque the analysis might be somewhat different; rugs are fre-
quently used in mosques as prayer mats. Would the product that was
“neutral” for the Christian church now be “religious” and thus ineligible
for funding in the mosque? If so, would that essentially require the gov-
ernment to discriminate based on the specific religion? This argument
seems to create more problems than it solves. Additionally, there is no
precedent to support the argument that funding to restore is not the same
as funding to advance. Ultimately the success of this line of reasoning
would be up to the Court’s discretion, but it seems highly unlikely that
this argument would be successful.
Finally, if FEMA funding houses of worship was found not to violate
the first two prongs, an analysis of the third prong would be warranted. It
seems to be the easiest argument that the funding would not violate the
third prong. However, this is irrelevant if the funding would violate either
of the first two prongs. FEMA funding of houses of worship would not
require any additional monitoring or inspection—at that point, the gov-
ernment would already know the money was going towards a religious
space, so there would be no need to check in and ensure that the space
remained secular in nature. Additionally, if FEMA were providing funds
for the entire facility, as opposed to only a prorated portion based on
secular use, there would be no issue of blending federal and private
money to fund the construction. Ongoing investigations and continued
ties seem to be the crux of the Court’s analysis for excessive entangle-
ments,140 and neither of those circumstances would exist here. One could
argue that funding the construction of sanctuaries would create a much
more significant version of the “symbolic-link” previously discussed; how-
ever, because the Court has disregarded the symbolic-link in the past,141
it seems unlikely that this argument would bear sufficient weight.
In conclusion, it seems highly unlikely that any policy to fund the re-
building of houses of worship would survive the Lemon Test. It would be
quite difficult to argue that the funding would advance an entirely secular
purpose. However, the most likely point of failure would be with the sec-
ond prong of the Test. Even the most neutral and modern Supreme Court
holding from Trinity Lutheran seems to impose limits in the context of
state-funded religious spending, and it is unlikely that proponents of the
funding would be able to establish that the funds would not advance re-
ligion in an impermissible way.
140. See id. at 688; see also Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 409–11 (1985).
141. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 613–14 (1988).
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3. Funding for Rebuilding Community Centers and Other Neutral
Spaces
Though federal funding of houses of worship likely violates the Estab-
lishment Clause, this does not mean that all disaster relief funding re-
ceived by religious organizations would also violate the Establishment
Clause. As a result, the concept of federal funding to rebuild other facili-
ties owned by religious organizations warrants consideration. Based on
the analysis above and for the purpose of this section, it is assumed that
houses of worship have been removed from FEMA’s list of eligible
services.
PNPs, including faith-based organizations and houses of worship, are
eligible to apply for Public Assistance funding to rebuild eligible facili-
ties.142 Eligible facilities are those that provide a critical service (such as a
parochial elementary school or a religiously affiliated hospital) or those
that provide a “non-critical, but essential social service” and are open to
the general public (such as homeless shelters, senior citizen centers, reha-
bilitation centers, and libraries).143 Based on these classifications, one can
infer that FEMA’s objective is to provide funding to restore facilities that
are critical or essential to a community’s ability to thrive—a clearly secu-
lar purpose. Additionally, the fact that these policies were originally en-
acted in a manner that specifically barred from eligibility houses of
worship or pervasively sectarian organizations lends significant weight to
the conclusion that the policies were not enacted with an intent to ad-
vance religion but rather were enacted for an entirely secular purpose.144
The threshold for the first prong of the Test has likely been met.
Moving to the second prong of the Test, we must determine if funding
to rebuild a facility (other than a house of worship) that is owned by a
religious congregation or faith-based PNP would advance religion in an
impermissible way.145 Because this federal funding would go towards re-
building or repairing buildings, the facts are most similar to those in Til-
ton, where the Court considered federal funds being used to construct
buildings on college campuses.146 Funding for facility construction is sig-
nificantly different than funding for ongoing programs or teacher salaries
because once a building is constructed, it will be there forever; whereas
with ongoing programs, the government is free to withdraw funding at
any time if the programs do not meet certain criteria. However, despite
this difference, the Court in Tilton upheld the HEFA because the statute
required grant recipients to provide assurance that the facilities would
not be “used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship”
142. AMENDED 2018 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE, supra note
12, at 10–14.
143. Id. at 11.
144. Compare 2017 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE, supra note 7,
at 14, with 2018 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE, supra note 10, at 14.
145. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971).
146. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 675 (1971).
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for at least twenty years after construction.147 The Court was further sat-
isfied with the mechanism of enforcement, because if the building was
used in an impermissible way during that period, the government would
be entitled to a prorated reimbursement.148 We must determine if funding
provided through FEMA could meet a similar threshold.
Unlike the HEFA, the revised FEMA Policy Guide does not have any
express prohibition on religious instruction or worship.149 Instead, the
Guide limits eligibility for funding by requiring facilities to have a “pri-
mary use” of providing one of the eligible services identified within the
Guide.150 The list of eligible services does not exclude activities or pro-
grams with a religious affiliation;151 instead, it focuses on the impact or
purpose of the eligible services. For example, the Guide expressly lists
homeless shelters and food assistance programs as eligible services but
makes no mention about whether or not the services come from a secular
or religious organization.
Because FEMA’s policy guide places emphasis on the programs/ser-
vices, and not the affiliations of organizations, the precedent from Bowen
becomes relevant.152 In Bowen, the Court emphasized the neutral nature
of the programs and services being provided (such as pregnancy testing,
counseling, and educational programs) and recognized their significance
in achieving a large-scale public goal, regardless of the organizations’ re-
ligious affiliation.153 This reasoning is similar to the situation at hand,
where FEMA’s objective is clearly to ensure that essential and facially
neutral services (such as food assistance, drug/alcohol counseling, and
sheltering the homeless) continue to be provided in the future. In the case
of facilities owned by a religiously affiliated PNP, which are used solely
for one or more of the eligible services, the inquiry into prong two likely
stops here. As explained in Bowen, the funding stands to advance the
facially neutral services and public objective, not the religion of the or-
ganization.154 Thus, the aid program likely would not advance religion in
an impermissible way.
However, further analysis is required in the situation of mixed-use fa-
cilities. As explained in Part III, “primary use” does not mean the space
cannot be used for any purposes other than the eligible services. Rather,
50% or more of the physical space or 50% or more of the operating time
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. See AMENDED 2018 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE, supra
note 12, at 13–14.
150. Id. at 13–15.
151. Compare 2017 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE, supra note 7,
at 14, with AMENDED 2018 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE, supra note
12, at 13.
152. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
153. See id. at 613.
154. See id. at 615.
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for the facility must be dedicated to eligible services.155 Thus, it is possible
that a building could be used for sectarian instruction or worship in a
minimal way and still qualify for FEMA funding. This possibility differen-
tiates FEMA’s policies from the HEFA, because there is a chance that
some FEMA funded facilities could be used for dual purposes, including
religious worship or instruction, whereas the HEFA expressly barred any
conduct relating to religious advancement.156 The chance of multi-use fa-
cilities is less likely in situations involving religiously affiliated organiza-
tions that exist solely to provide one or more services. However, multi-
use spaces are entirely possible and common in pervasively sectarian or-
ganizations. Many religious congregations own multi-purpose community
centers that are commonly used to benefit the congregation and the com-
munity as a whole. For example, a synagogue might have a community
center that offers Hebrew classes, Alcoholics Anonymous meetings,
youth meetings, and art classes.
FEMA seems to have accounted for the risk of mixed-use facilities in
their Policy Guide. The explanation of eligible facilities expressly states
that any facility with an eligible “primary use” that is also used for ineligi-
ble purposes is only eligible for funding in the proportion of the build-
ing’s eligible use.157 Thus, if 75% of a building’s use was dedicated to
eligible services but 25% was dedicated to Sunday school or other relig-
ious instruction, FEMA would prorate the funding based on the applica-
ble percentages and only provide sufficient funding to rebuild 75% of the
building. The applicant would then be required to provide the remaining
balance of the funding and restore the entire facility.158
These restrictions would ostensibly ensure that federal funding will
only go towards rebuilding “space” that is entirely secular in nature and
used for eligible services. Even though this “space” might be in the same
building that hosts activities such as religious instruction or worship, the
federal government would not have funded that portion of the building.
The fact that FEMA requires the facility owner to front the portion of
funding not being provided by FEMA to ensure the entire building is
completed prevents the organization from taking FEMA’s money and us-
ing it for purposes other than its original intent.159 Regardless of how the
money gets mixed up in the pot, or even if it all goes to the same contrac-
tor, FEMA has implemented a mechanism that ensures the federal gov-
ernment is providing only enough funds to rebuild the secular purpose of
the facility. This mechanism, like the mechanisms in Bowen and Tilton, is
likely sufficient to ensure that federal funding is not used to advance re-
ligion in an impermissible way.
155. See AMENDED 2018 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE, supra
note 12, at 16.
156. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 675 (1971).
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One argument in opposition of this conclusion would be that none of
the established precedent involves mixing federal and private funds to
build a multi-use facility. One could argue this is a clear example of creat-
ing a “symbolic-link” between the religious organization and the govern-
ment. However, the Court ruled in Bowen that the perception of a
symbolic-link is not sufficient grounds to invalidate a program under the
second prong.160 Furthermore, the Court allowed the parochial pre-
school to receive funding for a new playground surface in Trinity Lu-
theran, even though the school was ultimately responsible for the remain-
der of the playground.161 Granted, the playground in Trinity Lutheran
was already built and only the surface was being updated, so the funds
wouldn’t technically mix, but the case does establish precedent for facili-
ties built by a combination of state and private funds.162
Assuming that houses of worship are removed from the list of eligible
services, it would seem that FEMA’s policies establish a sufficient system
for ensuring states do not directly contribute to portions of buildings that
will be used for ineligible services, and possibly religious instruction.163
Thus, FEMA has likely created enough safeguards to prevent a violation
of the second prong of the Lemon Test. The issue of multi-use facilities
receiving funding would definitely be a contested point if this policy was
challenged in court. However, the Supreme Court’s tone in Trinity Lu-
theran seems to indicate that the Court prioritizes inclusion over strict
separation.164
Assuming that this revised program would pass the second prong, the
next step in the analysis is looking at the third prong—excessive govern-
ment entanglement. In this situation, the clearest argument for govern-
ment entanglement would be the mixing of funds to complete one
building, as discussed above. One could argue that combining federal and
private funds to construct or repair one building necessarily creates a gov-
ernment entanglement. However, the precedent does not seem to support
this. Though there is no spot-on precedent representing combined funds
to build facilities, there are similar cases that are sufficiently analogous
for their holdings to bear weight on this issue. As discussed above, in
Trinity Lutheran the playground’s new surface would be paid for with
government funding, even though the playground itself had already been
built using the church’s money.165 Furthermore, the aid program that was
upheld in Agostini would ultimately result in students receiving educa-
tions that were funded by a combination of State and private funds.166
The Court saw no issue with entanglement under these circumstances,
160. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 613–14 (1988).
161. See Trinity Lutheran Church of Colombia v. Cromer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024–25
(2017).
162. See id.
163. See AMENDED 2018 PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAM AND POLICY GUIDE, supra
note 12, at 16.
164. See 137 S. Ct. at 2024–25.
165. See id.
166. See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 209–14 (1997).
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which gives us some insight into how a court would rule in regards to
FEMA’s policies.
Moreover, even though FEMA’s Policy Guide would require FEMA
representatives to investigate the building’s former uses and future uses,
these minimal inspections would not rise to the level of excessive entan-
glement.167 This level of governmental involvement would be even less
significant than that required in Bowen, which the Court ultimately held
was permissible.168 Thus, because the investigation into building use
would require minimal contact and ongoing inspections, and because
there is no precedent directly prohibiting a shared source of funding, this
policy likely will not violate the third prong. Based on this analysis, it
seems likely that this portion of FEMA’s policy will survive a challenge
under the Lemon Test. However, it will be a significantly harder argu-
ment to win as opposed to the reimbursement plan discussed above.
Should the balance of the Court change, or if precedent begins to digress
back towards strict separation, the outcome of this analysis could easily
reverse.
C. SHOULD FEMA BE RE-BUILDING CHURCHES? DO POLICY
ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF FUNDING CHURCHES
OUTWEIGH ANY ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CONCERNS?
Despite the previous arguments, many proponents of funding the res-
toration of houses of worship argue that sound policy reasons outweigh
any concerns raised under the Establishment Clause. Truthfully, these
policy arguments are quite compelling. However, they are ultimately
flawed arguments. The Constitution stands on its own and is not subject
to limitations based on policy or what feels right. Because these argu-
ments were at the core of the lawsuits against FEMA, their significance
deserves discussion in this Comment.
Some argue that it is not strategic—and is borderline unethical—for
the government to deny funding to the religious organizations they so
heavily rely on in the wake of disaster. For example, in the aftermath of
Hurricanes Rita, Ike, and Harvey, FEMA relied on Hi-Way Tabernacle, a
church in Houston, to provide shelter, food, and medical care to many
evacuees.169 However, when that same church applied for funding from
FEMA to help repair damage caused by three feet of Harvey flooding,
the group was denied based on their religious primary function.170 From a
strategic standpoint, some argue this is unwise—if these churches are un-
able to recover, they will not be able to step in and help in future disas-
ters. Others call on a sense of duty and fairness, and argue that FEMA
167. Cf. Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 688 (1971).
168. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 617–18 (1988).
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needs to be able to “help[ ] the helpers, [and] not continue a policy of
irrational discrimination against churches.”171 Some might point to the
potential consequences of churches being denied funding and argue that,
unlike Trinity Lutheran where the “consequence [was], in all likelihood, a
few extra scraped knees,”172 a failure to rebuild churches could have a
detrimental impact on community services, involvement, and morality.
Others point to finances when making a policy argument in favor of
financially assisting churches. The federal government requires state re-
cipients of FEMA funding to “match” a portion of the federal funding,
however, they are able to credit the value of volunteer manpower to-
wards that contribution.173 Volunteer hours are valued at $25 per hour;
thus, for every volunteer involved in clearing debris, rescuing evacuees,
or caring for them in shelters, the state saves money that can then be used
to further benefit citizens. These volunteer hours save the state a signifi-
cant amount of money. For example, only weeks after Hurricane Harvey
made landfall, Samaritan’s Purse volunteers had already volunteered
more than 27,000 hours, which credited over $675,000 towards Texas’ re-
quired contribution.174 In some ways it seems illogical that the States can
benefit financially from religious organizations, but those religious orga-
nizations are ineligible for a financial benefit in return.
These arguments pull on the heartstrings, and honestly make a lot of
sense. To a person of faith, like myself, it is easy to question the legiti-
macy of these policy concerns and forget about the Constitution. How-
ever, as Aristotle wisely said, “law is reason without desire,” and this is
the truth that we must remember when balancing policy concerns against
the constitutional protections of the Establishment Clause.175 Even
though the arguments seem logical and valid, that alone is not enough to
overcome fundamental constitutional law. These policy considerations
certainly lend weight to the argument in favor of funding neutral spaces
owned by religious organizations; however, strong policy concerns are not
enough to justify the use of federal funds to construct or repair houses of
worship.
V. CONCLUSION
In the days that are to come proponents of strict separation will likely
challenge the revised FEMA policy and fight to deny the eligibility of
religiously affiliated organizations and houses of worship to receive fund-
ing altogether. Meanwhile, advocates of faith-based organizations will
likely fight to preserve the policy that allows funds for rebuilding sanc-
tuaries and houses of worship. These two distinct groups are each pulling
171. Id.
172. Trinity Lutheran Church of Colombia v. Cromer, 137 S. Ct. 2012, 2024–25 (2017).
173. Singer, supra note 5.
174. Id.
175. ARISTOTLE, POLITICS bk. III, at 1287a.32 (C.D.C. Reeve trans., Hackett Publishing
Co. 1998) (c. 350 B.C.E.).
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for polar opposite results, and ultimately, the court system should deny
both requests. Precedent suggests that under both the Lemon Test and
the holding in Trinity Lutheran, a revised FEMA policy affording relig-
ious organizations necessary opportunities for reimbursements and fund-
ing neutral spaces while drawing sufficiently distinct lines to ensure the
separation of church and state is the ideal solution. This result is the mid-
dle ground between the two sides of the argument and accurately reflects
the Supreme Court’s current shift from a call for strict separation to a
stance of modern neutrality.
No matter the result of this debate, one thing is certain—when the next
disaster strikes, religious congregations and organizations will be right
there working alongside FEMA. This historic collaboration is something
to be proud of, and regardless of personal religious beliefs, progress to-
wards ensuring religious nonprofits are ready and able to step in and help
during the next disaster is something we should all be striving for. In the
wake of disaster, they truly are a saving grace.
